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 Mind the Gap: Gender Wage Differentials in the Public Sector 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of an exploratory study of wage outcomes in the West 
Australian public sector. The research aimed to determine the effect of gender segregation on 
pay bargaining outcomes in a deregulated industrial relations regime. In the first part of paper, 
public sector employment relations are discussed and analysed. The second part of the paper 
provides a synopsis of the changes in the legislative and industrial relations environment in 
Western Australia. The final part of the paper examines the effect of gender segregation on 
bargaining outcomes in the Western Australian public sector. 
 
 Mind the Gap: Gender Wage Differentials in the Public Sector 
Introduction 
A gender wage gap is a characteristic and persistent feature of all types of economies 
(Petersen and Morgan, 1995; Rubery, 1992; Whitehouse, 1990). It has been argued that the 
largest gaps in earnings between males and females occur in those countries that have adopted 
decentralised pay bargaining systems (Pocock, 1996; Rubery, 1992). The shift to enterprise 
bargaining and a deregulated industrial environment in Australia has raised concerns about 
the ability of a range of workers, especially women, to secure satisfactory wage outcomes 
(Bennett, 1994; Still, 1995; Strachan and Burgess, 1997). This paper explores the effect of a 
deregulated industrial relations system on wage bargaining outcomes in the Western 
Australian public sector. Specifically, the study examines wage outcomes on an agency basis 
and analyses whether a gender effect can be discerned by comparing the bargaining results of 
male dominated agencies, female dominated agencies and those that are gender neutral.        
 
Results of this research adds to the body of literature discussing and analysing the gender 
effects of decentralised and deregulated industrial relations systems on wage outcomes. The 
findings of this research provide insights into the factors that may explain the propensity of 
the gender wage gap to widen in decentralised industrial relations environments. The research 
also attempts to establish whether apparently gender neutral wage policies have specific 
gender effects.   
        
Public Sector employment relations 
The public sector is chosen as the arena in which to investigate the effect of decentralisation 
and deregulation of industrial relations as this sector has a history of applying sector-wide 
employment and organisational policies. Traditionally the public sector was characterised by 
 the establishment of bureaucratic procedures to ensure decisions and actions were consistent, 
formalised and addressed systematically through the application of rules. In this sense the 
public sector was typically ‘rule-governed and predictable’ (Brubaker, 1984: 2) and relied on 
a career service with standardised terms and conditions of employment (Caiden, 1965: 2-4). 
While the introduction of a range of managerial reforms and significant restructuring towards 
a market environment changed the public sector, these sweeping changes did not realign pay 
relativities between agencies (Gardner and Palmer, 1997). However, it is argued the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining in the public service ‘challenges the uniformity and 
equity of pay and conditions…’ (Gardner, 1993: x). While a range of reforms have been 
implemented to alter the orientation and operation of the public sector, wages and conditions 
remained relatively constant across public sector agencies until the advent of workplace 
bargaining.  
 
It is postulated that in a highly deregulated industrial environment adverse gender outcomes 
may be replicated across agencies. In addition, in the new industrial climate it is not clear 
whether men suffer similar wage disadvantages as women in feminised agencies and whether 
women benefit from improved wage gains in male dominated agencies. In this way, a further 
area of research is to establish whether differential wage outcomes along gender lines can be 
discerned within highly gender-segregated agencies.  
 
At issue is the question of how changes in public sector wage bargaining have influenced the 
gender wage gap. It has been argued that public sector workplaces have a greater propensity 
to implement gender equity processes and measures than private sector workplaces (Boreham, 
Hall, Harley and Whitehouse, 1996). Typically, public sector wages and conditions have been 
 premised on a highly centralised system that has developed consistent policies and 
mechanisms for delivering improvements across the entire public sector.  
 
The Workplace Agreement Act 1993 and the subsequent legislative changes brought about by 
the second and third wave reforms established a highly deregulated and decentralised 
industrial relations regime in Western Australia (Bailey, Berger, Fells and Horstman, 2000). 
The new system allows for a range of pay outcomes between agencies by focusing on 
workplace agreements rather than enterprise agreements (Kierath, 1995). Consequently, the 
findings will determine whether women’s wage outcomes in the West Australian public sector 
have improved or declined as a result of changes wrought by the introduction of a more 
flexible industrial relations system. In this highly deregulated environment, wage outcomes 
across public sector agencies can be compared to determine if gender differences can be 
discerned. Agency pay outcomes are analysed and compared to generate data about the 
relative wage differentials in the various public sector agencies. This research examines the 
issue of whether a more flexible industrial relations regime may deliver a wide range of 
benefits to all employees as claimed by the Western Australian Liberal government (Kierath, 
1995) or the introduction of greater flexibility further entrenches wage inequity along gender 
lines. 
 
Methodology 
The Department of Productivity and Labour Relations (DOPLAR) data relating to public 
sector wage bargaining outcomes during the highly deregulated period of industrial relations 
from 1997-2001 for 21 West Australian government agencies were utilised for this research. 
Specifically, this period relates to the second round (1997-1999) and the third round (1999-
2000) of the wages policy periods. The percentage difference from the median salary rate for 
 each of the agencies included in the study was calculated. These data were grouped according 
to gender composition of each agency and used to determine whether pay equity outcomes in 
West Australian state public sector agencies varied according to whether an agency is 
segregated by gender. A gender-segregated agency is deemed to be an agency in which one 
gender is represented by greater than 60 percent, a measure used by the Work and Family 
Unit in the report, Work and Family: State of Play (1999).   
 
The research aimed to identify whether a gender domination effect could be discerned on an 
agency basis in the wage bargaining outcomes in the Western Australian public service. The 
agencies represented were randomly selected from three different groups, those agencies that 
were defined as male dominated where males comprised over 60 percent of total agency 
employees; those agencies that were defined as female dominated where females comprised 
over 60 percent of the total employees; and, gender neutral agencies where males and females 
comprised between 59 and 41 percent of the workforce (see Table 1). 
 
The results of wage bargaining in the selected agencies were tracked over the second and 
third round wages agreements. The timing of the bargaining period extended over a longer 
period as agencies underwent several rounds of bargaining and at different times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Gender Segregation of Selected Agencies in the WA Public Sector, 2000. 
Government Agency %Women 
Female Dominated Agencies  
Nurses Board 100 
Education Department of WA 76 
Department of Family & Children’s Services 73 
Disability Services Commission 71 
Wheatbelt Development 79 
Male Dominated Agencies  
Fire & Emergency Services Authority 9 
Dept Conservation & Land Management 28 
Treasury Department 29 
Dept of Contract & Management Services 32 
Department of Land Administration 33 
Agriculture WA 35 
Water & Rivers Commission 37 
Local Government 33 
Gender Neutral Agencies  
Department of Transport 45 
Small Business Development Corporation 60 
Aboriginal Affairs 51 
Homeswest 52 
Environmental Protection 41 
Sport and Recreation  51 
Worksafe 41 
  
Source: Adapted from MP&C, 2000.  
 
The industrial relations environment in Western Australia  
Since the introduction of the enterprise bargaining principle in 1991 and specifically 
following the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cwlth), there has been 
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 scope for more localised wage bargaining and greater flexibility in allowing non-union 
agreements to be struck (Charlesworth, 1997; Gardner and Palmer, 1997). Under the new 
arrangements, all state industrial tribunals have developed a range of processes for bargaining 
at the workplace including allowing both collective and individual agreements to be 
negotiated and non-union as well as union bargaining to be conducted (Gardner and Palmer, 
1997: 203).  
 
It was argued that Western Australia has shifted more dramatically away from the arbitral 
model than any other state in Australia due to the legislated, deliberate exclusion of unions, 
awards and the state tribunal in the industrial relations system (Gardner and Palmer, 1997: 
205). In this way, the study allows an examination of the results of bargaining over wages and 
conditions in a highly deregulated system of industrial relations.  
 
It was contended that the new industrial relations environment in Western Australia 
introduced with the election of the Conservative government in 1993 supported a framework 
of decentralisation and deregulation of industrial relations and had a strong focus on 
promoting individual agreements between employers and employees without the interference 
of third parties such as the union and the arbitral tribunal (Bailey, et al., 2000). The overall 
outcome of these legislative changes to industrial relations was expected by the government 
to be ‘improved co-operation between employers and employees at the workplace level, 
greater flexibility at work and the devolution of decision-making and responsibility at the 
workplace level’ (Fells and Mulvey, 1994: 289). Introducing highly flexible arrangements in 
workplace bargaining and agreement-making not only allows the parties scope to reach 
agreements that may cater for the different parties requirements, however, it may also 
 entrench inequity in a system in which unequal power relationships cause difficulties for 
particular groups of workers to bargain effectively with employers.  
 
Three ‘waves’ of legislative change from 1993 to 1997 resulted in a system that included 
introducing workplace agreements, changes restricting union involvement in bargaining and 
providing services and, simplifying a range of statutes governing employee relations (Bailey, 
et al., 2000). The outcome was that the legislative changes delivered a highly flexible set of 
arrangements for public sector wage bargaining and changed the role of public sector unions 
in providing services to members.   
 
Changes to the industrial relations system have resulted in a system that essentially operates 
with four major forms of agreement making. Parties may choose to retain the existing system 
of awards, or decide to opt out of the award system to shift to either collective or individual 
workplace agreements or, to engage in developing enterprise agreements (known as Section 
41 agreements) (Fells and Mulvey, 1994) Collective agreements are premised on non-union 
involvement with severe restrictions on ability of unions to appear as a party to the 
negotiations (Kierath, 1995: 56). 
 
By June 1999, 21 per cent of public sector employees were covered by workplace agreements, 
just over 40 percent of employees were covered under State Industrial agreements, 37 percent 
were party to federal certified agreements and 1.8 percent of employees were not covered by 
any agreements (DOPLAR, 1999). 
 
The high degree of flexibility in wage bargaining promoted through industrial legislation in 
Western Australia provides an opportunity a study the effects of a decentralised industrial 
 relations system on overall bargaining outcomes in particular public sector agencies. 
Specifically, outcomes can be discerned to determine whether there may be identifiable trends 
relation to the bargaining performance of agencies that are over-represented by one gender or 
another compared to those that are gender neutral. Segregation by gender is argued to result in 
a labour market in which women are concentrated in a small range of occupations with 
generally low rates of remuneration (Whitfield and Ross, 1996). It may be that gender 
segregation is a determinant in discerning the reasons for differential outcomes in a wage 
bargaining regime that allows for a diversity of wage outcomes across a single industry 
sector, the public sector.  
 
Gender segregation and wage bargaining outcomes 
The effects of the historically uneven distribution of employment conditions and outcomes for 
women workers has meant that occupational and industrial segregation by gender is a 
significant problem, argued to be “one of the sharpest measures of labour market inequality” 
(Windsor, 1990: 138). Theories explaining unequal labour market and wage outcomes tend to 
focus on discriminatory behaviour and processes in education, wages and employment 
(Whitfield and Ross, 1996). However, it is also recognised institutional factors may cause 
disadvantage and hinder access to higher paid jobs and career paths for different groups in the 
labour market (Whitfield and Ross, 1996).      
 
Pay equity issues are generally argued to be located in the institutional processes of 
bargaining and the evidence showing the extent of the gender pay gap in decentralised 
systems compared to centralised systems establishes a compelling case to substantiate these 
claims (O’Donnell and Golder, 1986, Whitehouse, 1992). However, there are also a range of 
other factors that may contribute to the continuing differential between men and women’s 
 earnings. Fieldes (1997) argued that a high level of union militancy achieved a significant 
narrowing of the earnings gap between men and women in a time of decentralised wage 
fixing. Boreham et al. (1996) contend that bargaining power may be a significant factor in 
gaining access to better wage outcomes in an enterprise bargaining environment and argue the 
inability of women to secure equivalent wage outcomes may be due to the their lack of 
involvement and marginalisation in the processes of bargaining.    
 
The existence of a highly gender segregated workforce is argued to create a labour price 
penalty for workers in feminised jobs (Pocock and Alexander, 1999). In this way, Pocock and 
Alexander (1999) contend that the historical undervaluing of jobs within female dominated 
industries and occupations contributes to the continuing gender wage differential. The 
difficulties in unions pursuing cases of equal pay adjustments due to time restraints, lack of 
political will and deficiencies in terms of expertise and resources are argued to result in 
inadequate compromise solutions rather than a re-valuing of jobs undertaken by women 
(Rafferty, 1991).  
 
Across the West Australian public sector, gender segregation can be evidenced in the 
predominance of female-dominated agencies and male–dominated agencies compared to the 
number of gender-neutral agencies. In agencies such as the Water Corporation, Treasury, 
Fisheries Department and Police over 70 percent of total employees are male and agencies 
such as Westrail, Western Power, Main Roads WA comprise over 80 percent male employees 
(Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (OEEO) 1999). Agencies such as the Department 
of Health, Department of Community Services, Education Department, and Authority for 
Intellectually Handicapped Persons comprise female-dominated workforces having over 60 
 percent female employees (OEEO, 1999).  Table 2 outlines the makeup of the West 
Australian government agencies based on gendered segregation type.  
 
In effect there is evidence not just of a gender wage gap but segregation by industry and oc-
cupation. The existence of highly sex-segregated workforces within WA agencies allows test-
ing and comparison of the effect of male and female ‘voice’ in wage bargaining outcomes.  
 
Table 2. Gender Segregation in West Australian Government Agencies 
Gender segregation Type Number of Agencies 
Female Dominated Agencies 36 
Male Dominated Agencies 36 
Gender Neutral Agencies 53 
  
Source: Adapted from MP&C, 2000.  
 
The initial findings of this exploratory study indicate that gender dominated agencies are not 
able to secure comparable wage outcomes and there appears to be a domination effect evident 
when public sector agencies are allowed to undertake wage bargaining on an individual 
agency basis. A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a significant gender segregation 
difference, F(2,18) = 4.67, p < .05. Specifically, post hoc Tukey test demonstrated that male 
dominated agencies had a better wages outcome (M=3.24%) than female dominated agencies 
(M=-2.95%). Figure 1 displays the average percentage salary outcome for each type of gender 
segregation compared to the median salary.  
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Figure 1. Wages Outcomes based on Percentage Differentials (median $37,895) 
 
Gender pay differentials may be explained by a range of demand side factors including higher 
pay levels in areas of labour shortages such as emerging high technology areas, (ACIRRT, 
1999). However, the bargaining outcomes in the different agencies clearly indicate that there 
is a gender effect across agencies. The initial findings in this study suggest that the processes 
of bargaining may also provide some indication as to the differences in outcomes in pay. The 
agencies in the study sample utilised predominately workplace agreements rather than 
enterprise agreements to secure wage increases.      
 
Boreham et al.’s (1996) study of equity measures introduced under enterprise bargaining 
indicates that feminised workplaces are unable to achieve comparable results to other types of 
workplaces and concluded that women’s ‘interests are systematically marginalised and 
remain unrepresented’ (p. 65). New conditions such as introduction of family leave, cultural 
leave, the provision for cashing in annual leave, the ability to work 48 out of 52 weeks per 
year have been introduced under the new legislation, although while over 70 percent of 
agreements have access to family leave, the other areas are not as well represented as only 20 
 percent have access to cultural leave, 10 percent allow cashing in annual leave and only 5 
percent have the potential to utilise the 48/52 option (DOPLAR, 1999). 
 
Fells (2001) argues that enterprise bargaining in the public sector ushered in new forms of 
bargaining arrangements, however, the findings here also indicate that those agencies which 
capture the largest gains may not necessarily have produced the best outcomes in terms of 
efficiency and productivity. It may be that greater outcomes are achieved by superior 
bargaining strategies, relative high power in negotiations or a strong bargaining position 
through exogenous factors such as competitive advantage in the labour market. 
 
With the election of the Labor government in February 2001, the government ‘declared its 
preference for collective over individual employee representation’ (Fells, 2001). The 
espoused policy position was to translate employees from workplace agreements to enterprise 
agreements, offer new employees enterprise rather than individual agreements and to 
negotiate with unions on sector-wide basis (Fells, 2001). The effect of this approach may be 
to halt the wages drift between agencies and provide a more consistent method of maintaining 
wage relativities between public sector employees. 
 
Conclusion 
The results of this exploratory study indicate that gender overrepresentation of public sector 
agencies accords with particular wage bargaining effects. These findings concur with the 
study by Boreham et al. (1996) that established that in developing equity measures under 
enterprise bargaining, feminised agencies in the Queensland public sector were marginalised 
and bargaining power was eroded.   
 
 Further research is required to determine the specific bargaining strategies adopted by the 
different agencies and whether these strategies altered the balance of bargaining power and in 
turn, affected agency bargaining outcomes. In addition, the labour market characteristics of 
the different agencies should be investigated to determine whether demand side factors might 
have influenced outcomes in wage levels. 
 
A salient issue in relation to these early results however, is that findings have shown that in a 
deregulated industrial relations system, male dominated agencies have been able to secure 
larger wage increases overall than both gender neutral agencies and female dominated 
agencies. It is clear that female dominated agencies have been unable to make significant 
overall gains in a more flexible environment. The widening disparity in bargaining outcomes 
may be slowed in the West Australian public sector due to the shift to sector-wide bargaining 
and a move away from individual workplace agreements initiated by the incoming Labor 
government.    
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Table 1 – Sample Statements for the Groups of Factors 
Factor 
Push 
Personal 
Organisational 
Job Characteristics 
Work Environment 
Pull 
Attractive Job Alternative 
Ease of Finding A new Job 
Being Headhunted 
Organisational 
Job Characteristics 
 
 
